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Introduction 
On 16 December 2013, the South-Sudanese president Salva Kiir announced that soldiers 
aligned with former vice president Riek Machar attempted a coup (BBC, 2013), accusations 
that Machar denied two days later. A few months earlier, he was dismissed, together with the 
rest of the cabinet, after stating that he wanted to challenge Kiir in the 2015 elections. Machar 
argued that Kiir tried to remove his political opponents by accusing them of staging coups and 
that he wanted to turn the country into a dictatorship (Blas, 2013a; 2013b; Al Jazeera, 2013). 
Three years later, the consequences of this power struggle became apparent. The country 
experienced a civil war between the ethnic communities Kiir and Machar belong to: Kiir has 
the support of the Dinka and Machar of the Nuer. Both tribes began killing civilians from the 
other tribe, which caused tens of thousands of deaths and almost 900.000 refugees 
(Economist, 2014; UNHCR, 2016; Al Jazeera, 2016). 
 In 2005, the situation in the country was different. After a civil war between northern 
and southern Sudan, a peace agreement was signed, and it was agreed that South Sudan could 
vote on its independence in 2011 (Kebbede, 1997; Medani, 2011). In 2010, South Sudanese 
citizens were allowed to vote in elections for the first time in their lives. This led to much 
enthusiasm among the citizens. In contrast to northern Sudan, UN diplomats believed that the 
South could organize free and fair elections (Lindijer, 2010a). The 2011 referendum result 
showed unity because 98,8 percent of the population voted in favor of independence 
(Christopher, 2011: 129). This peaceful referendum was conducted in accordance with the 
standards for democratic elections and the outcome appeared to be the true will of the people 
(Carter Center, 2016). Together with the statement from the South Sudanese government that 
it intended to democratize (Kiir Mayardit, 2011; Lindijer, 2010b), this gave the region a 
positive outlook. However, instead of becoming a functioning minimal democracy that 
brought political stability, South Sudan turned into a failed state (Loewenstein, 2015). The 
power struggle between the excessively powerful president and his former vice-president 
resulted in a civil war along ethnic lines. Hence, this thesis answers the following question: 
Why did South Sudan fail to build a politically stable democracy after its independence? 
 
Literature Review 
In the academic literature, different theories of democratization can be found. Some scholars 
explain democratization using factors such as a shared national identity (Rustow, 1970), or 
the presence of a ‘modern state’ (Rose & Shin, 2001). Some others use modernization theory, 
stating that economic development leads to democracy by causing social and cultural changes 
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(Lipset, 1959; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2009; 2010). Democratization is one of 
the most effective ways to keep domestic peace and to build stable political institutions, 
which reduce the likelihood of civil war (Hegre et al, 2001: 44; Halperin, Siegle & Weinstein, 
2010: 93).  
 These are all relevant ideas about what matters in democratization processes, and 
probably all influence the creation of political stability. However, other scholars have shown 
that those factors are not necessary conditions for building politically stable democracies. 
Lijphart (1977) and Horowitz (1985) argue that it is possible to build consociational or 
centripetal democracies in ethnically divided states that do not have a strong shared national 
identity, a well-developed economy, or modern states. Examples of these states are Lebanon 
(1943-1975), Malaysia (1955-1969), and Nigeria (1979-1983). The theories of Lijphart and 
Horowitz dominate the debate on how to build a politically stable democratic state in 
countries that are ethnically divided. Lijphart argues that consociational systems need to be 
set up. This means a grand coalition, in which leaders of all important groups are represented; 
a mutual veto, to allow protection of minority rights; proportionality in elections and the 
allocation of public office; and segmental autonomy, which makes groups capable of dealing 
with their own internal affairs (Lijphart, 1977: 25). This consociational model is criticized by 
Horowitz. He argues that if ethnic parties in consociational system decide to compromise with 
other groups, they can easily be replaced by more extreme parties that argue that the 
compromising politicians sell out the interests of their groups. Hence, consociationalism can 
lead to extremism (Horowitz, 2000: 258). Instead, Horowitz argues that a system should be 
set up that enables moderates to come to power and build interethnic coalitions because of 
incentives given by the electoral system and federalism (Horowitz, 1985; 1991; 2000; 2008). 
This thesis will assess which of these theories can better explain the influence of the political 
system on political instability by applying it to South Sudan. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework used, is based on two main prescriptive theories on how to build 
democracies that lead to political stability in deeply divided states: consociationalism and 
centripetalism. Political stability here refers to “system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy, 
and effectiveness” (Lijphart, 1977: 4). It is also necessary to note that while both scholars 
discuss the concept of democracy, this does not require perfect liberal democracies. Lijphart 
specified that he is not discussing “a system of government that fully embodies all democratic 
ideals” (Lijphart, 1977: 4). This theoretical framework consists of three sections. First, the 
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ideas of Lijphart will be discussed. Second, the centripetal model of Horowitz will be 
covered. Third, both theories will be put in contrast and scrutinized critically.  
  
Consociationalism 
Consociationalism is the political system recommended by Lijphart to deeply divided 
societies. The idea of a consociational system is that diverging factors within a plural society 
are counterbalanced by the willingness of the political elites of the different groups within that 
society to cooperate. The cooperation between the different political elites is the most 
important condition for a system to be considered consociational (Lijphart, 1977: 1). A 
consociational democracy is based on four core characteristics: grand coalition, mutual veto, 
proportionality, and segmental autonomy.  
 First, a grand coalition means that leaders of different important groups within society 
work together to rule the state. This avoids minorities being constantly kept out of the 
government (Lijphart, 1977: 25-26, 30). Consociationalism does not require a specific 
government set up as long as all major groups are represented. However, Lijphart does state 
that parliamentary systems are more suitable for grand coalitions than presidential ones, 
because, in presidential systems, often one leader forms the executive and dominates over his 
ministers who merely serve as advisers, and in parliamentary systems there is a cabinet in 
which ministers form the executive together and are relatively equal in power (Lijphart, 1977: 
33; 2008: 80-81). Nevertheless, Lijphart does not exclude a presidency and there are 
examples of consociational systems in which this is applied. Bosnia, with its three-member 
presidency and Switzerland, in which the presidency rotates between the members of the 
Federal Council, are such examples (Belloni, 2004: 345; Lijphart, 1977: 34). 
 Second, a mutual veto should be implemented in a consociational system, which 
safeguards vital minority interests. Grand coalitions ensure that minorities are represented in 
the government, but whilst a majority of the cabinet would be able to make decisions, the 
interests of minority groups would still not be respected. Hence, to protect the vital interests 
of minorities, a mutual veto is required (Lijphart, 1977: 36-37).  
Third, proportionality is essential to build a democracy in deeply divided countries in 
two ways: firstly, the electoral system needs to be based on proportional representation, which 
helps with the representation of minorities; secondly, public office appointments and 
government subsidies need to be proportionally divided among different groups (Lijphart, 
1977: 25, 38-40; 2008: 8). The idea of proportionality also refines the concept of a grand 
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coalition, because it adds that the positions in the grand coalition needs to be divided 
proportionally (Lijphart, 1977: 38-39).  
 Fourth, segmental autonomy is requisite. This means, in policy areas that are relevant 
to all segments, decisions are reached together with every group having proportional 
influence, but where policies matter to only one segment, decisions should only be made by 
the leaders of this segment. Consociational democracy encourages division of society in clear 
segments that have their own organizations (Lijphart, 1977: 41-42). Additionally, when 
groups are living separately in their own regions, federalism is useful in carrying out the 
concept of segmental autonomy, because the different groups in society could govern their 
own segments through a government at the state level (Lijphart, 1977: 42-43).  
 
Centripetalism 
A contrasting model to build a functioning democracy in an ethnically divided state is 
Horowitz’ centripetalism. This is a decentralized presidential political system in which 
electoral and territorial incentives are created for moderates to come into power, make 
compromises on issues that divide ethnic groups, build interethnic coalitions, and create a 
government where an interethnic majority rules (Horowitz, 1985; 1991; 2014: 5).  
Horowitz (2000: 259; 1985: 378-379) agrees with Lijphart that a government should 
be multiethnic, but instead of a grand coalition, a majority government should be formed 
consisting of moderate centrist politicians from different ethnicities: an interethnic coalition. 
When a society is deeply divided, compromises and accommodation are required to have a 
stable political system. There is a higher chance that moderates accomplish this than 
extremists (Horowitz, 2008: 1216). Horowitz argues that the idea of an interethnic coalition 
differs from consociationalism in that it does not need ethnic leaders to act on the basis of 
“conciliatory feelings that do not exist”, but they would merely act out of self-interest. This 
self-interest stems from electoral and territorial incentives (Horowitz, 2000: 259). 
The first incentive is the adopted electoral system. In a centripetal democracy, ethnic 
parties are rewarded for attracting voters outside their own ethnic group. This happens most 
often because of coalitions with other ethnic parties (Horowitz, 2008: 1217; 2000: 260). The 
assumed mechanism is that to attract these voters and form interethnic coalitions, ethnic 
parties must show moderation and readiness to make compromises on ethnic issues 
(Horowitz, 2008: 1217). An alternative vote system is most ideal according to Horowitz. This 
is a majority system: a candidate in a constituency needs to win a majority, but the “winner-
take-all aspects” of a plurality system are alleviated because voters need to rank their 
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preferences for candidates (Horowitz, 1991: 166). This system rewards politicians and parties 
that try to win second and third preferences of voters, which encourages moderation. To make 
this system work, constituencies have to be heterogeneous. If this is not the case, vote-pooling 
will not work (Horowitz, 1991: 189, 195). These ideas demonstrate a main difference between 
consociational and centripetal democracies: consociationalists form post-electoral grand 
coalitions, while centripetalists build pre-electoral moderate centrist interethnic coalitions 
(Horowitz, 2014: 5-6). 
The second incentive is federalism. Horowitz states, in contrast to Lijphart, that 
heterogeneous states can function well in a federal system. They can cause political 
socialization because different ethnic groups have to cooperate at the state level and learn 
about each other before working on more complicated national issues (Horowitz, 2007: 960). 
Homogeneous states can also be useful when they lead to subethnic differences, and stimulate 
political competition within an ethnic group (Horowitz, 2008: 1218). Additionally, 
decentralization makes it less important to be part of the national government. This is the case 
because parties that cannot secure power at the national level, can still influence decision 
making at the state level. Hence, politics becomes less of a zero-sum game (Horowitz, 1991: 
221-222). Decentralization allows states to realize that they have disagreements or common 
interests irrespective of their ethnicity. Thus, interethnic cooperation can be practiced at a 
lower level (Horowitz, 1991: 222).  
Another element of centripetal democracy is a presidential system, which can bring 
political stability in two ways. Firstly, a president can increase the likelihood of power 
sharing, because it is impossible for one ethnic group to dominate the whole country 
permanently by winning a majority in parliament. Secondly, the office of president provides 
another platform for conciliation (Horowitz, 1991: 205). These two features of a presidency 
can be performed best when the presidential electoral system is built on vote pooling 
(Horowitz, 1991: 205). This can be done by setting up an alternative vote system, or a system 
in which a presidential candidate does not only have to win the most votes, but these votes 
have to be geographically distributed. Such systems make it more likely that the president will 
be a moderate panethnic figure, and, hence, helps with reducing ethnic tensions (Horowitz, 
1991: 206). 
 
Two Theories Compared 
It is apparent that both theories prescribe opposing models. Lijphart prefers a parliamentary 
system, while Horowitz supports a presidential one; Lijphart thinks that a proportional 
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electoral system is the most suitable, while Horowitz favors a preferential one. They also have 
different ideas about federal systems, as Lijphart prescribes homogeneous states that cause 
segmental autonomy, and Horowitz wants heterogeneous states that lead to integration and 
moderation (McCulloch, 2009: 59; Caspersen, 2004: 571). Both authors doubt the 
effectiveness of each other’s model. Lijphart’s model is founded on the good intentions of 
elites to work together despite the cleavages in society, because they understand the 
drawbacks of the otherwise (Lijphart, 1977: 100; Caspersen, 2004: 571). Horowitz finds this 
unrealistic and argues that leaders act out of self-interest, which is why they need incentives 
to cooperate (Horowitz, 2000: 259). Lijphart, on the other hand, criticizes Horowitz’ model 
for failing to protect minority rights and argues that it is unlikely that these groups will accept 
being represented by moderates of other groups (Lijphart, 2002: 48-49). Another important 
divergence is that Lijphart’s model is built on experiences of western countries such as the 
Netherlands and after that applied and recommended to non-western countries (Lijphart, 
1977). Horowitz, on the other hand, constructed his model on the experiences of non-western 
states such as Nigeria and Sri Lanka (Horowitz, 1985).  
In practice, consociationalism has the most examples of application. An analysis of 
consociationalism in Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC by Lemarchand (2006) shows that 
Burundi, in which consociationalism was well-applied, created political stability, while 
Rwanda and the DRC, which poorly implemented consociationalism, failed to create this. 
This provides some support for consociationalism, because a full implementation encourages 
stability. However, Lemarchand’s (2006: 19-20) analysis also shows that the success of 
consociationalism depends on the “socio-political context,” which consists of the identities of 
the different parties involved, the geopolitical context, and political state of affairs in a 
country. Another example is Bosnia. Caspersen (2004) shows that Bosnia implemented both 
consociational and centripetal elements and that due to the deep divisions in society, 
consociationalism has contributed more to creating stability. However, the centripetal 
institutions were functioning more effectively (Caspersen, 2004: 585). Examples of 
centripetalism are Fiji and Papua New Guinea. The case of Fiji does not support 
centripetalism – it had an alternative vote electoral system but this caused extremism instead 
of moderation (McCulloch, 2009: 89; Fraenkel & Grofman, 2006: 623). In Papua New 
Guinea, however, the alternative vote system caused the accommodative political behavior 
that Horowitz predicted (Reilly, 1997: 9). All in all, it can be stated that consociationalism has 
been applied in more cases than centripetalism, and that the results of both systems in 
achieving political stability are mixed. 
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Research Method and Data 
Method and Case Selection 
Strategies of state-building in Africa have been widely reported. Lijphart and Horowitz 
developed two well-established prescriptive models of how to build a democracy in divided 
states. They also specifically argue that their models are the best way to create politically 
stable states in ethnically divided societies in Africa (Lijphart, 1977: 164; Horowitz, 1991). 
Although such clear models exist, Africa is the continent in which failure seems more 
common than success. By looking at the world’s newest state, South Sudan, in which there 
was a strong desire to become a democratic peaceful state after getting rid of the repression 
and violence that was experienced before (Kiir Mayardit, 2011), this thesis hopes to add to the 
existing knowledge on why state-building often fails in Africa, and to what extent the theories 
of Lijphart and Horowitz can help explaining this. 
In this thesis, a case study on the influence of the political system on the political 
instability in South Sudan, will be conducted. To achieve this, first, the political system that 
was set up in the transitional constitution of South Sudan will be analyzed. Second, this thesis 
will cover the functioning of the South Sudanese political system between independence on 9 
July 2011 and the end of December 2013, the moment when the civil war started. Thirdly, the 
theoretical ideas of Lijphart and Horowitz will be compared in their explanatory power. The 
research method applied in this thesis is, thus, the comparative test of two theories.  
Problems with the validity of the findings of a single-case study are recognized. 
Generalization of findings is difficult (Toshkov, 2016: 304). However, generalization is not 
the goal of this thesis. By explaining why the political system in South Sudan failed to 
maintain political stability, two well-established theories are tested, and the acquired 
knowledge will provide insights into the functioning of elements of both theories (Toshkov, 
2016: 305). South Sudan forms a suitable case to apply to this debate. It has a deeply divided 
society and, on first sight, elements of both theories were implemented in its political system. 
For instance, a presidential system was set up, its first government consisted of members of 
different ethnic groups, and a decentralized system was built. From the perspective of both 
theories this creates expectations for political stability, which was not achieved. Hence, the 
case of South Sudan can provide insights into the applicability of both theories (Toshkov, 
2016: 285). 
  
Data 
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Data are gathered from different sources. Primary sources include the South Sudanese 
transitional constitution. Other sources refer to academic literature, reports of NGOs, and 
news articles from Dutch and international media, as well as local sources such as the Sudan 
Tribune – a nonprofit website that provides news from Sudan and South Sudan – and the 
South Sudan News Agency. The sources used are from or related to the period from 
independence on 9 July 2011 until the end of December 2013, when civil war broke out. 
 
Analysis 
In this section the political system of South Sudan will be analyzed. Firstly, a short 
introduction will be given on the 2011 transitional constitution and subsequently this will be 
critically discussed from both a consociational and centripetal perspective. Secondly, the 
same will be done for the political system in practice. 
 
The 2011 Transitional Constitution 
On 9 July 2011, South Sudan became an independent country and a transitional constitution 
entered into force. This was an amendment of the 2005 Interim Constitution, and it was 
drafted by a commission, consisting of members of the SPLM, the opposition, and 
representatives of civil society, within half a year (Auer et al, 2011: 24). There is no public 
record of the discussion within this commission, rendering the decision-making process 
opaque. The only public knowledge was that the president has changed its composition, and 
that it operated under a tight timeframe, because the constitution had to be finished before 
independence on 9 July (Auer et al, 2011: 24-25). 
 The transitional constitution was put in place until a new permanent constitution was 
adopted, however, despite guidelines were provided for the Commission that had to design it, 
there was no plan of when that would happen (Auer et al, 2011: 27; GOSS, 2011: 76). The 
transitional constitution contained general information about the constitution and the state; an 
extensive bill of rights; chapters on fundamental objectives and guiding principles; and set up 
the political system (GOSS, 2011; Auer et al, 2011: 23). Nevertheless, it contained several 
gaps and problems. For instance, the electoral system of the country was not decided yet; 
there was no term limit for the president; the president had powers to intervene in the 
judiciary and legislative power, and there was an unclear role for independent commissions 
(Auer et al, 2011: 31-34). 
South Sudan adopted a presidential system with a dominant role for the president in 
the executive (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2016; GOSS, 2011: 32). The legislative power, 
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following a bicameral system, composed of the National Legislative Assembly as the lower 
house, and the Council of States as the upper house (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2016). In the 
transitional constitution that was adopted in 2011, it was stated that “South Sudan is governed 
on the basis of a decentralized democratic government” (GOSS, 2011: 2). Therefore, local 
government should play a significant role in the political system.  
 
The Transitional Constitution from a Consociational Perspective 
The 2011 transitional constitution of South Sudan entrenches several consociational elements. 
The most critical element of consociationalism, the grand coalition (Lijphart, 1977:  25), is 
recognized by stating that: “the composition of governments shall take into account ethnic, 
regional and social diversity in order to promote national unity and command national 
loyalty” (GOSS, 2011: 11). Another constitutional provision – “ministers of the National 
Government shall be selected with due regard to the need for inclusiveness based on integrity, 
competence, ethnic and regional diversity and gender” – also demonstrates this (Goss, 2011: 
38). Hence, it can be said that the South Sudanese constitutional idea of a government comes 
close to a grand coalition. 
 The South Sudanese system contains elements of proportionality, but they differ from 
Lijphart’s ideas. The exact electoral system is yet to be designed by a special commission. A 
degree of proportional representation in this commission was adopted on paper: “the 
Commission shall be established with due regard for gender, political, social and regional 
diversity of South Sudan …” (GOSS, 2011: 76). Additionally, government, civil service and 
National Security Service jobs were supposed to be divided among different groups in society 
as the transitional constitution mentions: “Civil Service shall be broadly representative of the 
people of South Sudan …” and: “in its composition, the National Security Service shall 
reflect the diversity of the people of South Sudan” (GOSS, 2011: 47, 56). Although these 
elements do not specifically mention proportionality, they show the intention that 
appointments are diverse and representative of all people. There is however no mention about 
how the civil service will be appointed in a way that is broadly representative of the 
population and no mechanism has been set up to create a proportional allocation of public 
funds. 
 Segmental autonomy is, to a limited degree, present in the transitional constitution. It 
splits the country up into 10 states (GOSS, 2011: 57). Most of these states are heterogeneous. 
However, one state is almost solely inhabited by Dinka and the three southern states are 
mostly inhabited by people from Equatorian tribes, which is a group of tribes among which 
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regionalism is a uniting factor (OCHA, 2009; Wël, 2015; Paul, 2012). Segmental autonomy is 
more present at a local level. The transitional constitution delegates many functions to the 
local level, recognizes traditional authorities, and states that self-governance has to be 
promoted (GOSS, 2011: 60). The local county level matches to a reasonable degree with the 
distribution of ethnic groups. There are several heterogeneous counties, but in many places, 
ethnic groups have a county to themselves (OCHA, 2009). Hence, at the state level, the model 
diverts from what Lijphart prescribes, but at a local level a limited amount of segmental 
autonomy is provided by the constitution. 
 The problems with the transitional constitution according to consociationalism are in 
twofold. Firstly, there is no mutual veto. This is problematic concerning the protection of the 
vital interests of minority groups (Lijphart, 1977: 36). Secondly, the most important problem 
in the South Sudanese political system is the role of the president. The presidency that was set 
up in South Sudan does precisely what Lijphart (1977: 33; 2008: 80-81) opposes: it makes the 
president dominant, and as a consequence, one group can dominate. The president has the 
right to appoint and remove the vice president and all ministers (GOSS, 2011: 35, 38). 
Therefore, he can remove members of other ethnic groups from the government. Additionally, 
the president has much more power than the other members of the executive (GOSS, 2011: 
33-34, 37), and possesses powers that are in contrast to the separation of powers, as the 
president can determine the agenda of the legislature and appoint all judges in the judiciary 
(Auer et al, 2011: 32). 
 
The Transitional Constitution from a Centripetal Perspective 
Horowitz prescribes a preferential electoral system, an interethnic coalition, a panethnic 
president, and decentralized governance (Horowitz, 1991). Preferential voting or territorial 
incentives are needed to create moderation (Horowitz, 1991: 202-203, 206). These are not 
incorporated into the constitution. The transitional constitution lacks an electoral system, 
which is already problematic. But if the 2010 electoral system, would be adopted, a 
combination of a first-past-the-post system and proportional representation would be used for 
parliamentary elections and a simple majority one for presidential elections (Carter Center, 
2010: 17). These systems do not encourage moderation (Horowitz, 1991: 197-199). Some 
other moderating provisions are present in the transitional constitution, such as a separation 
between state and religion, to prevent a regime as in Sudan; and a provision that the 
government encourages national unity, reconciliation, and peace (GOSS, 2011: 3, 10), but 
these are not incentives that let politicians act moderately out of self-interest. 
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Instead of providing incentives to build moderate interethnic coalitions, the 
transitional constitution prescribes grand coalitions (GOSS, 2011: 11, 38). Without 
moderating incentives, this means that governments should involve representatives of all 
groups and that their willingness to work together does not matter. This is problematic 
according to Horowitz, because these elites have to act on the basis of “conciliatory feelings 
that do not exist” (Horowitz, 2000: 259). Horowitz thinks that the function of president should 
be created because it prevents domination by one group and forms another platform for 
conciliation. However, without incentives to encourage panethnic presidents, it is unlikely 
that presidents will be stabilizing (Horowitz, 1991: 205-206). Instead, the president got 
powers to dominate the executive and influence the legislature and judiciary (Auer et al, 
2011: 32). Hence, the South Sudanese presidency encourages domination and offers no 
platform for conciliation. 
 The only moderating incentive is decentralization. States got directly elected 
legislatures and executives and could raise their own taxes (GOSS, 2011: 57-59, 81). Most of 
the South Sudanese states were heterogeneous. Decentralization could facilitate representation 
of groups, unrepresented in the central government, in their states. This helps with the 
political socialization of interethnic cooperation and makes national politics less zero-sum 
(Horowitz, 2007: 960; 1991: 222). Furthermore, local governance consisted of urban and rural 
councils, that could also raise their own taxes, and traditional authorities. These local 
governments had important tasks of encouraging local communities’ participation in local 
governance, dialogue between them, and peace and reconciliation initiatives (GOSS, 2011: 
59-60). Most local governance would take place in homogeneous societies, but the 
constitutional provision that local governance must promote dialogue and reconciliation could 
play a political socialization function. 
All in all, the transitional constitution came closer to Lijphart’s prescriptions than to 
Horowitz’. The consociational elements, grand coalition, proportionality and segmental 
autonomy, were to some degree present, but a mutual veto was lacking and the presidency 
could become a dividing force. From the centripetal perspective, the political system contains 
on first sight a presidential system and decentralization, but the role of the president is too 
dominant, the idea of a grand coalition is unstable, and incentives for moderation are lacking 
at the center. However, the decentralized system provides some hope from the centripetal 
perspective.  
 
South Sudanese Politics in Practice 
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The context in which the South Sudanese state had to be built was difficult: the country was 
underdeveloped, illiteracy was present among public officials, ethnic violence was common, 
and the relations with Sudan remained tense (McConnell, 2011; Gettleman, 2011; Times, 
2011). Nevertheless, there were also opportunities: citizens wanted peace; the country had 
economic potential for its oil reserves; there was a well-educated diaspora; and South Sudan 
received large amounts of development aid (McConnell, 2011; Dowden, 2011b; New York 
Times, 2011; Kulish, 2013; McLean, 2012; Kristof, 2011). 
At independence, some public institutions were inherited. South Sudan possessed an 
army and some ministries, police and security services, a legislature, a judiciary, and an 
executive in the form of a president Kiir (Guardian, 2011; Woolf, 2011). The SPLM was the 
political party in power and could, hence, dominate. It consisted mainly of former rebels from 
all ethnic groups that had to learn to be politicians and it held 90 percent of the seats in 
parliament (Woolf, 2011; Baas, 2013; Freedom House, 2013). At independence, the multi-
ethnic SPLM was a party that was still united. This could be seen in the appointment of a 
multi-ethnic cabinet (Sudan Tribune, 2011; Lupai, 2011; NRC Handelsblad, 2013b). After 
some time, it appeared that this cabinet was kept together by neo-patrimonialism (Tisdall, 
2013). Due to the costs of maintaining this system, only a small budget was available for state 
development and the strengthening of local governance (World Bank, 2012). Hence, it was 
not surprising that new tribal conflicts, such as between Nuer and Murle, were not prevented 
(McConnell, 2012). When a new conflict with Sudan started about oil, which accounted for 
98 percent of South Sudan’s income, and production was shut down, government spending 
was cut drastically (Woolf, 2012; McNeish, 2012; Starkey, 2012b). In July 2013, Kiir 
dismissed Machar and the whole cabinet (New York Times, 2013). Six months later, Kiir 
accused soldiers aligned with Machar of a coup attempt. Soon after this, Machar fled out of 
Juba. Other critics of Kiir, among whom 7 were former ministers, were arrested (Howden, 
2013). This led to severe ethnic violence. Dinka soldiers started an ethnic cleansing campaign 
against the Nuer in Juba, and Nuer attacked Dinka elsewhere. Ethnic hatred between the 
Dinka and Nuer had returned and political stability had fully disappeared (Starkey, 2013; 
Gladstone & Cowell, 2013).  
 
South Sudanese Politics from a Consociational Perspective 
The transitional constitution gave some hope for political stability, but in practice South 
Sudan soon lost its limited stability. Proportionality, which was present in the constitution, 
was realized to some degree. The 2010 electoral system was 60 percent first-past-the-post and 
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40 percent proportional (Carter Center, 2010: 17). The main difference with ideal 
consociationalism is that segments usually have their own party. In South Sudan, the SPLM 
was the main party that held 90 percent of the seats and consisted of representatives of all 
groups (Baas, 2013; Freedom House, 2013). The rest of the seats were held by the SPLM-
Democratic Change – a split-off of the SPLM and the largest opposition party –, the National 
Congress Party – the party that rules Sudan –, and independents (Freedom House, 2013; Wël, 
2011). Because the SPLM was multiethnic, the partial first-past-the-post system did not limit 
proportional representation as much as when all segments would have had their own parties. 
The fight against the north led to a united desire for independence, and, hence, the SPLM was 
multi-ethnic and had broad support at independence (NRC Handelsblad, 2013a; Dowden, 
2011b).  
The parliamentarians chosen in the 2010 elections, automatically transferred to the 
South Sudanese institutions after independence. The main issue regarding proportionality was 
that Kiir appointed 66 of the 332 MPs and 30 of the 50 members of the Council of States 
(Alic Garang, 2013: 4; Freedom House, 2013). Unfortunately, there is no information 
available on their tribal affiliation, but Kiir’s later behavior shows that, when possible, he 
appoints loyal fellow Dinka or members of other tribes that were eager to join his neo-
patrimonial network (De Waal, 2014; Volkskrant, 2013; Awolich, 2016: 7). 
Proportionality in the civil service was only realized in the army. During the Sudanese 
civil war, the SPLM was not always united. Riek Machar and his Nuer, and Lam Akol and his 
Shilluk left the party in 1991 but returned in the early 2000s. Equatorian tribes also formed 
their own militias because of fear for Dinka dominance (Baas, 2013; Lindijer, 2010b). Kiir 
integrated leaders of these militias into the high ranks of the army, and the lower members 
became part of the state’s military and security service (Baas, 2013). It is however 
questionable whether this proportionality was reached for good intentions, because this 
integration seems logical for someone that wants to protect his position. Proportionality in 
other civil service areas was however lacking. This was hard to create, but was also not tried, 
because nepotism was used for granting jobs (Smith, 2012). Because Dinka held the main 
government posts, many Dinka were appointed in the civil service. For example, more than 
50 percent of the ambassadors were Dinka, which is more than proportional (Buay, 2012). 
The state was the main provider of paid jobs and an unfair representation led to unequal 
development among tribes (Baas, 2013).  
Regarding segmental autonomy, the transitional constitution promised decentralization 
and local self-governance. Due to civil war many local government structures were destroyed 
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and had to be rebuilt. Local councils were founded, but members were not elected by local 
communities, often without government experience, and did not know what to do. Financially 
they depended on the national government’s oil revenues, and local government income was 
limited to minor customs duties (World Bank, 2012; AWEPA, 2014). Cutting down local 
governance budgets by 85 percent and having barely any tax incomes, made local service 
delivery difficult (Agbor & Taiwo, 2012: 14). Therefore, governors lacked abilities to do their 
job properly. Moreover, to create segmental autonomy by decentralization, local leaders need 
support from their communities. However, local councils were fired and appointed by state 
governors, who were in 80 percent of the cases appointed by the president. Hence, public 
legitimacy was limited and local governors had to obey, and sometimes bribe, state governors 
(Awolich, 2016: 7). The only government level that had real local support were traditional 
authorities. But instead of building local councils around these traditional leaders, they were 
subordinated by people appointed by and loyal to state governors (Awolich, 2016: 7). 
Realizing segmental autonomy is hard when governors lack both financial means and public 
legitimacy.  
The most important element of consociationalism, the grand coalition, was approached 
in South Sudan’s first cabinet. It consisted of members of different ethnic groups. Of the 29 
ministers, 11 were Dinka, 7 were from different Equatorian tribes, 4 ministers and the vice 
president were Nuer, and the rest were from other smaller tribes such as the Shilluk (Sudan 
Tribune, 2011; Lupai, 2011; NRC Handelsblad, 2013b). The cabinet adhered to 
proportionality. The Dinka, approximately 36 percent of the population, held almost 40 
percent of the ministerial positions. The Nuer, around 16 percent of the population, had 
control over 14 percent of the ministerial posts and the position of the vice president. Other 
positions went to members of other tribes (Sudan Tribune, 2011; CIA World Factbook, 2011). 
On first sight, the idea of a grand coalition was well-implemented, but the essence of a 
grand coalition is that representatives of different groups work together to rule the state. The 
grand coalition consisted of former rebels without proper education and governing 
experience. They appeared more occupied with enriching themselves and their networks than 
ruling the country, which was apparent from half the budget being spent on advancing 
personal gains for cabinet members and another 25 percent on the army (Tisdall, 2013), more 
than 4 billion dollars of government funds being stolen since 2005, and it failed to provide 
basic services such as education and health (Dowden, 2011a; 2011b; Smith, 2012; 
Chonghaile, 2012). The grand coalition was limited because of the president’s dominance. 
The transitional constitution empowers Kiir much more than other cabinet members, which is 
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contrary to consociationalism. Consequently, governmental decision making was dominated 
by Kiir. South Sudan became ruled at the center by presidential decrees. Kiir, for example, 
replaced elected public officials by issuing decrees, and, hence, made sure that loyalists were 
present at important functions (Gatkuoth Gatluakn, 2014; Alier Akuot, 2013; Awolich, 2016: 
7).  
Furthermore, because the president was much more powerful than other government 
members and there was no mutual veto, it formed an opportunity for one group to dominate. 
This happened already when the mixed cabinet was still in place, but it worsened when 
Machar expressed his intention to compete in the 2015 elections. The Dinka essentially ruling 
the country, brewed anger among other ethnic groups (Eveleens, 2013b; Volkskrant, 2013; 
Howden, 2013). Thus, challenging Kiir was unsurprising. In July 2013, Kiir decided to fire 
his cabinet to remove his political opponents, and win the power struggle with Machar 
(Eveleens, 2013b; Nourhussen, 2013). The new cabinet would be the end of the grand 
coalition. The large majority of the ministers was now Dinka. Of the 18 ministers, 11 were 
Dinka, 4 were from Equatorian tribes, and 3 were Nuer (Sudan Tribune, 2013; Puok Baluang, 
2014). Nevertheless, one must note that Nuer ministers were seen as traitors by fellow Nuer 
(Mayen Tut, 2015). Hence, the regime was sometimes called a ‘Dinkocracy’ by other tribes 
(Volkskrant, 2013; Howden, 2013).  
 
South Sudanese Politics from a Centripetal Perspective 
The transitional constitution lacked already moderating electoral and territorial incentives. 
However, lacking these incentives did not prevent Kiir from choosing Machar as his running 
mate, and forming a pre-electoral coalition between Dinka and Nuer in 2010 (Gatdek Dak, 
2010). This happened because in 2010, the uniting prospect of independence formed a 
moderating incentive (Dowden, 2011b). Incentives for a panethnic president were also absent, 
but at independence, Kiir could count on broad support among almost all South Sudanese 
because of the independence struggle and, thus, did border on the idea of a panethnic 
president (Lindijer, 2010a). Nevertheless, the moderating independence incentive was 
temporary, because, since independence, unity progressively withered (NRC Handelsblad, 
2013a; Dowden, 2011b). 
The government however remained intact for 2 years despite that the desire for 
independence had disappeared. Horowitz argues that grand coalitions fail because ethnically 
divided leaders are self-interested and would not work together because they are good 
statesmen and have conciliatory feelings. They require incentives to collaborate (Horowitz, 
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2000: 259). However, South Sudan did not provide such incentives. Cooperation between 
elites was based on incentives of enrichment. De Waal (2014: 361) puts this nicely by stating 
that “corruption is the system” and that “Kiir’s main instrument of governance was permitting 
members of the elite to join the kleptocratic club.” When unsatisfied rebel leaders went back 
to the bush, Kiir tried to appease them with high government or army positions and expensive 
villas. Hence, most of the government’s budget was spent on maintaining the system 
(Eveleens, 2011; NRC Handelsblad, 2013a; De Waal, 2014: 361). 
This means that electoral and territorial incentives are not the only motives to 
stimulate interethnic cooperation: neo-patrimonialism can be too. However, political systems 
held together by incentives based on corruption are unstable (Fagbadebo, 2007: 29), which is 
logical considering when there are not enough financial means to maintain the system, it 
implodes. This was the case in South Sudan (De Waal, 2014: 365). In January 2012, South 
Sudan shut down oil production because of a conflict about oil revenues with Khartoum 
(Hills, 2012; Starkey, 2012a; Kushkush, 2013). This was disastrous, because it threatened the 
limited stability in South Sudan. South Sudan’s revenues relied for 98 percent on oil exports. 
The neo-patrimonial system that united political elites in Juba was fully built on these 
revenues (Lindijer, 2012; Trouw, 2012a). When Kiir’s presidency was challenged, he lacked 
the financial means to buy his opponents off (De Waal, 2014: 365). This worsened relations 
within the party and Kiir received more criticism, which made him more authoritarian. He 
increased his control over security forces and restricted the freedom of NGOs and media 
(Smith, 2014). The growing authoritarianism of Kiir divided the SPLM. Machar, for instance, 
stated: “To avoid authoritarianism and dictatorship, it is better to change” (Smith, 2014). 
Machar stated his intention to challenge president Kiir in the next presidential elections. A 
few months later, Kiir removed his opponents by firing them (New York Times, 2013). 
The presidency reflects that although Kiir approached the idea of a panethnic president 
when he was elected, he did not perform the moderating functions Horowitz prescribes and he 
gradually became more Dinka-oriented. Firstly, as already predicted, Kiir was too dominant. 
Horowitz (1991: 205) prescribes presidential systems to prevent domination by enjoying a 
majority in parliament, but in South Sudan, one group could dominate by holding the 
presidency. Kiir confiscated lawmaking power from the legislature, and parliament only 
endorsed laws (Awolich, 2016: 8). Additionally, he could dismiss and appoint cabinet 
members and state governors, which he did when it suited him. He replaced 80 percent of the 
elected state governors by loyalists, and when other cabinet members became a threat, he 
dismissed them (New York Times, 2013; Awolich, 2016: 7). Secondly, the presidency was no 
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platform for conciliation. This could only come true through elections which stimulate 
candidates to appeal to different ethnic groups (Horowitz, 1991: 205). Although Kiir did 
appeal to most groups in 2010, missing both strong opposition parties and an electoral system 
that encouraged cross-ethnical appeals, allowed him not to perform this moderating function. 
Hence, the presidency remains a possibility of unequal power-sharing when presidents move 
away from their panethnic orientations. 
The decentralized system in the transitional constitution provided hope from the 
centripetal point of view. In practice, however, decentralization was very limited. Although 
state legislatures and executives were set up, Kiir determined who was in charge (Awolich, 
2016: 7; Frahm, 2014: 204; World Bank, 2012). In January 2013, for example, Kiir replaced 
Lakes State governor Mayay, a close political ally of Machar (Frahm, 2014: 174). 
Furthermore, states were dependent on the national government for their revenues. They did 
not, or barely, set up their own tax systems, and often, the central government’s money would 
not arrive (World Bank, 2012; Frahm, 2014: 204). Because most states were ruled by 
appointed officials, loyal to Kiir, public legitimacy was lacking and state governments could 
not perform a political socialization function or make politics at the center less of a zero-sum 
game, because what happened at the state level was determined at the center. 
Local governance was also expected to perform a political socialization function 
because of facilitating dialogue and reconciliation. An example shows that this was possible. 
In 2009, hundreds of civilians were killed through ethnic violence in Akobo. Together with 
the county commissioner, NGOs focused on the fundamental causes of local ethnic conflict. 
An important one was that raiding cattle was the livelihood of the youth (All Africa, 2011). 
To solve this, they were provided with brick making machines and taught to handle them. The 
local government agreed to buy these bricks for building facilities. Additionally, the county 
commissioner got communication devices to be able to communicate when intertribal 
relations would get tense (All Africa, 2011). Historically, conflicts were solved through 
meetings between elder tribesmen, the traditional authorities. They sat together and tried to 
solve divisive issues before civilians were killed (Woolf & Craze, 2011). These groups were 
also supported by NGOs and got better facilities. Therefore, the approach was economically 
supporting people and restoring conflict-resolution mechanisms that were severely damaged 
during decades of civil war. The result was significant reduction of intertribal violence (All 
Africa, 2011). However, local governance, when present, lacked funds to develop such 
initiatives in most of the country (Frahm, 2014: 210; World Bank, 2012) and reconciliation 
initiatives were set up at the center: the Committee of National Healing, Peace and 
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Reconciliation started a spiritual healing campaign, and although it wanted local initiatives, it 
lacked funds to do so (Frahm, 2014: 272). 
 
Conclusion 
In this thesis, it has been discussed why South Sudan failed to build a politically stable 
democracy after its independence. Both Lijphart’s consociationalism and Horowitz’ 
centripetalism form part of the explanation. The consociational elements present on paper 
were poorly implemented in practice. Creating perfect proportionality and segmental 
autonomy can also not be expected in a short period in an underdeveloped country, but 
instead of attempting to create this, proportionality was only realized in the army and replaced 
by nepotism elsewhere, and segmental autonomy was very limited because local government 
was weak, it lacked public legitimacy, and traditional authorities were subordinated by Kiir’s 
loyalists. The poor implementation of these consociational elements was together with 
missing a mutual veto, however, maximally background influence on the end of limited 
political stability. There is no clear link between lacking proportionality or a mutual veto and 
the outbreak of ethnic violence. Moreover, it is questionable whether a fully implemented 
segmental autonomy could have been stabilizing, because hostile intertribal relations go back 
to the days when traditional authorities were not undermined by other state structures 
(Richardson, 2011).  
The grand coalition is more important in explaining the failure to build political 
stability. Building a government that contained representatives from different tribes did 
however not cause stability, but as Horowitz predicted, leaders need incentives to cooperate, 
and for two years getting rich formed such an incentive. When economic problems 
diminished the incentive to cooperate, the system imploded. Another important element 
seemed to be the people that form the grand coalition. Power was in the hands of former 
rebels that fought for decades against the Khartoum regime. The case of South Sudan shows, 
not for the first time in history, that good fighters are not necessarily good political leaders 
(Eveleens, 2013a; Baas, 2013; Lemarchand, 2006: 19). These former rebels were so used to 
their military role, that the threat of using violence was a common means of bargaining (De 
Waal, 2014: 348). They also often lacked the required education to perform in the functions 
that they held. Well-educated South Sudanese from the diaspora, who were more qualified to 
build up the state, were often ignored (Broere, 2012).  
The role of the president was another important factor. Kiir could dominate the whole 
political system by appointing and firing officials, ruling the country by decrees, and 
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intervening in the legislature and judiciary. By being this dominant, the presidency formed the 
dividing factor that Lijphart’s ideas predicted. When a power struggle between a Dinka, Kiir, 
and a Nuer, Machar, erupted, the country was quickly divided along ethnic lines. 
Additionally, the poor implementation of a decentralized system, prescribed by Horowitz, 
also played a role. The Akobo example showed that state and local governance could play a 
political socialization function. The transitional constitution contained many elements that 
would set this up, but in practice it was implemented poorly. 
This case study teaches us lessons about both consociationalism and centripetalism. 
Firstly, grand coalitions depend on what people are in it. This factor was not mentioned by 
Lijphart. This is understandable because his model was based on countries in which grand 
coalitions were not formed between former rebel leaders that lack education. This is 
supported by Lemarchand’s (2006: 19) and Baas’ (2013) findings that the identities of the 
parties matter. Secondly, this thesis provides support for Horowitz’ idea that incentives 
matter. The grand coalition only stayed together as long as its members benefitted. A system 
with moderating electoral and territorial incentives could have helped. Thirdly, it is 
questionable whether segmental autonomy is beneficial for political stability in Africa. The 
decentralized system proposed by Horowitz, in which contact between different groups plays 
an important role, seems better for resolving tribal animosities. Fourthly, although the 
presidential model that was set up is not what Horowitz prescribes, the change of Kiir, from a 
president that had national support and approached the idea of a panethnic one, into one that 
favored his own tribe, does not provide support for Horowitz’ advice to build presidential 
systems in divided societies. If a parliamentary system had been built, the problem of a 
dominating president would not have been there, and since the power struggle for the 
presidency was an important cause of the civil war, a parliamentary system would at least 
have prevented this cause. Hence, a parliamentary system is a better idea for divided societies. 
 It is recognized that there are limitations to the conclusions reached in this thesis. 
Firstly, the political system provides only part of the explanation of why South Sudan failed 
in building a politically stable system. Factors such as economic development, only 
considered marginally here by addressing oil revenues, have certainly played a role. 
Secondly, information on the functioning of state and local governance is often lacking. 
Besides these limitations, the finding that some of the prescriptions of both Lijphart and 
Horowitz were not supported by this thesis, make it questionable whether these models are 
suitable for Africa. Hence, future research is needed on the influence of the effect of 
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presidential/parliamentary systems, people’s identity, and segmental autonomy on the 
political stability of divided societies in Africa by doing comparative case studies. 
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